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Hospital Value Based Purchasing and the Bundled
Payment Initiative Under the Affordable Care Act:
A Good Start, But is it Good Enough?
Nita Garg*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States spends more per capita on health care than any other
nation; yet, the U.S. does not achieve better health care outcomes compared
to other developed nations.' Many of the discussions on how to reform the
health care industry have focused on how to best contain these escalating
costs. One frequent suggestion as how best to accomplish these goals
would be to end the traditional healthcare payment model of fee-for-service.
This model has contributed to the overuse of tests and treatment by
providers for the sake of higher profits,2 and moreover, this reimbursement
model has no real relationship with provider performance and patient
outcome. 3
One of the proposed solutions to this problem is a
reimbursement model that ties payment to providers with patient outcome
in an attempt to simultaneously decrease healthcare costs and improve
healthcare quality.
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), 4
Medicare will utilize two new outcome-based reimbursement models. Over
seven million Medicare beneficiaries experienced more than 12.4 million
inpatient hospitalizations in 2009." Another study concluded that one in
* Nita Garg is an associate at Barnes & Thornburg, LLP. She earned her J.D. from The
University of Texas and her LL.M. in Health Law from Loyola University Chicago.
1. Health Care Spending in the United States and Selected OECD Countries, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (2011), http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/OECD042111 .cfm.
2. Jacob Goldstein, An M.D. On How Money Drives Medical Testing, WALL ST. J. (July
7, 2009, 8:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/07/07/an-md-on-how-money-drivesmedical-testing./
3. Id.
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.).
5. Administration Implements New Health Reform Provision to Improve Care Quality,
Lower Costs, HEALTHCARE.Gov (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/
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seven Medicare patients will experience an "adverse" event such as a
preventable illness or injury while in the hospital.6 One in three Medicare
beneficiaries who leave the hospital today will be readmitted to the hospital
within a month. Additionally, every year, close to 100,000 Americans die
from medical errors in hospital care.8 These errors lead to significant and
unnecessary healthcare spending. Medicare spent an estimated $4.4 billion
in 2009 to care for these errors, and subsequent readmissions cost Medicare
another $26 billion.9
In response to these staggering statistics, the federal government has
responded by proposing two demonstration projects under PPACA that
attempt to use payment incentives as a way to improve quality while
reducing unnecessary costs. The first project, Hospital Value Based
Purchasing,o utilizes a pay for performance payment model, while the
second project, the Bundled Payment Initiative," utilizes an episodic
payment model. Providers under these arrangements would be rewarded
for meeting quality measures and reducing cost. This is a fundamental
change from the fee-for-service model of reimbursement, which financially
rewards providers for providing more services, regardless of the quality, or
outcome, of those services. 12
Pay for performance (commonly referred to as "P4P") is a payment
model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting performance measures
for quality and cost efficiency.13 While there are clearly incentives to
improve quality and reduce cost, the effectiveness of pay for performance
models on a large scale has not been conclusively proven. 14
The episodic payment model is a reimbursement model where payment
is for all services associated with an episode of care, such as a hospital
admission. This goes beyond hospital diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) by
bundling hospital, physician, and other clinical services into a single rate.15

factsheets/2011/04/valuebasedpurchasing04292011a.html.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Improving Care Coordination and Lowering Costs by Bundling Payments,
HEALTHCARE.GOV (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/
08/bundlingO8232011 a.html.
12. Id.
13. Cheryl L. Damberg et al., Taking Stock Of Pay-For-Performance: A Candid
Assessment From The Front Lines, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRs 517, 517 (2009).

14. Id. at 523.
15. Robert E. Mechanic & Stuart H. Altman, Payment Reform Options: Episode
Payments is a Good Place to Start, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRs 261, 265 (2009).
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"It would also increase accountability for outcomes by extending the
episode to a period of perhaps thirty days beyond the hospital discharge." 1 6
Payers would develop rates based on the resources needed to provide care
that is consistent with established clinical guidelines.
While this move by Medicare into the realm of outcome-based payment
will be the first large-scale shift away from the fee-for-service
reimbursement model in health care, the private and public sector have
already tried to respond to increasing healthcare costs, coupled with
concerns over quality, with mixed results. The Federal government is
placing considerable faith in the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program
and the Bundled Payment Initiative to solve the conundrum of cost and
quality. While these two programs are currently Medicare-based, the hope
is that these programs will not only prove successful in Medicare, but
ultimately change the way health care is delivered in the Medicaid and
private health care industries as well. This paper will explore how these
two programs created by the Federal government are structured and whether
there is a need for change if these programs are to meet the high
expectations that have been placed on them to reduce cost and improve
quality.
Unfortunately, the Federal government has proposed
reimbursement models that will prove to be inadequate and ineffective at
accomplishing their stated goals. Consequently, these two programs must
undergo significant changes before any dramatic difference will be seen in
both the cost and quality of health care in the United States.
In Section II, this paper will provide a brief background on how the
current state of health care has led to interest in simultaneously reducing
cost and improving quality. Healthcare costs in the United States are
significantly higher than other developed nations, yet there has not been a
corresponding increase in positive healthcare outcomes.
Section III of this paper will explore the Medicare Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing program, the first large-scale value-based purchasing program.
This section will examine how this reimbursement model is structured and
look into what the Medicare program, and thus the Federal government,
hopes to accomplish by implementing this reimbursement model next year.
After looking at value-based purchasing, Section III will continue by
exploring the Bundled Payment Initiative. Launched under a new branch of
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), The Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, this program shifts payment from a
traditional fee-for-service reimbursement model to a model that provides

16. Id.
17. Health Care Spending in the United States and Selected OECD Countries, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/OECDO4211 1.cfm.
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payment to cover an entire "episode of care." This section will look into
how this reimbursement model is structured and what CMS is hoping to
accomplish with this demonstration program.
Section IV will investigate the potential flaws of these two federal
demonstration projects by looking into the weaknesses of these programs
and possible unintended consequences. This section will examine the
validity of the potential criticisms and whether the benefits of these
programs will outweigh the criticisms. In this section, the paper will also
explore possible modifications that could be made to the current programs.
While the Value-Based Purchasing Program and the Bundled Payment
Initiative are steps in the right direction, their current structure is too narrow
in scope and with far too many weaknesses to make fundamental changes in
how health care is reimbursed and in the quality of health care being
delivered.
II. BACKGROUND
A The Statistics
The United States spends more on health care than other developed
countries.19 In 2006, the United States spent $2.1 trillion, the equivalent of
sixteen percent of the national GDP, on health care. 20 This translated to a
per capita rate of $7,026 annually.21 Unlike other developed countries that
provide near-universal coverage, the United States has a significant
uninsured population. In 2006, close to fifty million people, (over sixteen
22
percent of the U.S. population) were without health insurance coverage,
and, therefore, likely without consistent access to health care services.
According to a report from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, "the
increased attention to health care costs is merited and likely reflects the
recent trend of health insurance premiums-the most visible indicator of
healthcare costs-growing at a much faster rate than workers' earnings. ,,3
Data from the Kaiser Family Foundation-Health Research and Educational

18. As this paper is not intended to delve deeply into why health care costs are rising,
but rather, explore the programs intending to deal with this concern, there will only be a brief
discussion of the reasons behind, and the future of, high health care costs.
19. Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 1.
20. SARAH GOODELL, M.A. & PAUL B. GINSBURG, PH.D., HIGH AND RISING HEALTH
CARE COSTs: DEMYSTIFYING U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING [hereinafter DEMYSTIFYING] 1
(Robert Wood Johnson Found./The Synthesis Project, Princeton N.J., eds. 2008).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Trust Annual Employer Survey 24 and the U.S. Department of Labor 25
indicates that premiums for employment-based private insurance increased
114% from 1999 to 2007, while earnings increased twenty-seven percent,
leaving a gap of seven percentage points per year, on average.26
The gap between health spending trends and income trends likely
has led to a sharp increase in the proportion of the population
concerned about their ability to afford health insurance in the
future. When health care spending grows at much faster rates than
GDP or workers' earnings, health insurance becomes less
affordable-and more people become uninsured. Those who can
continue to afford coverage are finding that premiums and
payments for medical care not covered or paid for by insurance are
becoming increasingly large over time in relation to income. 27
What is behind these escalating health care costs? In a 2008 report, the
Congressional Budget Office identified seven key factors driving the
historical growth of health care spending: (1) an aging population; (2)
changes in third-party payment; (3) personal income growth; (4) health
sector prices; (5) administrative costs; (6) defensive medicine and supplierinduced demand; and (7) technology-related changes in medical practice.2 8
Researchers have identified the latter as a leading factor, responsible for
anywhere from one-third to two-thirds of the growth in real per capita
health care spending.2 9
B. Spending Projections
According to the most recent annual National Health Expenditure (NHE)
projection by the CMS Office of the Actuary, released in 2010, NHE
reached $2.6 trillion in 2010 and has grown 3.9 percent, down from 4.0
percent in 2009.30 Spending growth in 2010 was slow in response to

24. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. AND HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER
HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY, 2007 (Kaiser Family Found. eds.) (2007),
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf.
25. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

CURRENT EMPLOYMENT
STATISTICS. AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS, NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED, 1999-2007 (2007),

available at http://www.bls.gov/ces/ - tables.
26. DEMYSTIFYING, supra note 20, at 1.
27. Id.
28. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE GROWTH OF HEALTH
CARE SPENDING. 8, (Publ'n No. 2764.) (2008).
29. DEMYSTIFYING, supra note 20, at 11.
30. National Health Expenditure Projections 2010-2020 1, CTR. FOR MEDICAID AND
MEDICAID SERVS. (2010), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2010.pdf.
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declines in both the employment rate and private health insurance coverage
resulting from the recession. 1 GDP growth in 2010 was projected to have
been 3.8%, nearly the same growth rate as the NHE.3 2 The health share of
GDP is expected to have remained constant between 2009 and 2010 at 17.6
percent.33
Both private health insurance and out-of-pocket spending were projected
to grow between 2011 and 2013.34 Private health insurance spending is
projected to grow close to five percent in 2013, up from close to three
percent in 2010.35 This growth is a result of expectations of employersponsored insurance enrollment increasing with gains in employment. 36
Out-of-pocket spending is projected to grow by nearly four percent in 2013,
up from close to two percent in 2010, as growth in household incomes is
expected to lead to related growth in health care spending and as it is
anticipated that employers will increase cost-sharing requirements in
employer-sponsored insurance plans.3 In 2014, health care spending is
projected to grow 8.3%.38 The projected acceleration in the growth rate is
most likely a result of coverage-related expansions.39 Under PPACA,
Medicaid eligibility requirements in 2014 will include persons under age
sixty-five in families with income up to 138% of the Federal Poverty
Level.40 Consequently, "Medicaid enrollment is expected to increase by
19.5 million people and spending is projected to grow 20.3%.",41 The new
state Health Insurance Exchanges are expected to cover nearly fourteen
million people in 2014 and "contribute to 9.4-percent growth in private
health insurance spending." 4 2
According to the CMS Office of the Actuary, forecasts for periods much
longer than ten years are implausible, as the extrapolation of current trends
would project nearly the entire United States GDP directed toward health

31.

Id.

32
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
National Health Expenditure Projections 2010-2020, CTR. FOR MEDICAID AND
MEDICAID SERV. 1 (2010) available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2010.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. National Health Expenditure Projections 2010-2020 1, CTR. FOR MEDICAID AND
MEDICAID SERV. (2010), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2010.pdf.
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care costs. 43 As a result, longer-term projections "work from the other
direction, [by] considering how much health spending growth society will
tolerate."44 As such, the forecasters conclude that both private and public
sectors will eventually take more aggressive actions to control spending
than has been the experience to date.4 5 The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) recently published a forecast also questioning the long-term
sustainability of the upward trend in health care spending. Under the CBO
predictions, health care spending will reach "forty-nine percent of GDP in
2082. This implies that between 2018 and 2082, health spending would
increase only 1 percentage point," 46 -quite a shift from the current trend.
The rising cost in health care is understandably a significant cause for
concern for all health care payers, but more so for the federal government,
as Medicare is the largest single payer of health care services in the
country. 47 With spending projections forecasting rising costs without an
end in sight, there has been added pressure to find a way to stunt the growth
in spending. As will be discussed in the next section, an added layer to this
concern is the increase in costs has not seen a subsequent increase in quality
of care received by patients.
C. Concerns about Quality
While rising health care costs are a significant part of the health care
conundrum, just as important, if not more important, are concerns about the
quality of health care being provided in the United States. As mentioned in
the introduction, the United States has a mortality rate higher than other
developed countries. This is especially surprising when considering that the
Unites States also spends significantly more on health care than these other
developed countries. 48 At the beginning of the new millennium, the World
Health Organization ranked the health systems of close to 200 nations.49
France and Italy ranked first and second while the United States ranked
43.
44.

DEMYSTIFYING, supra note 20 at 5.
Id.

45.
46.

Id.
Id.

47. Stuart Guterman et al., Using Medicare Payment Policy to Transform the Health
System: A Framework for Improving Performance, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 238, 238 (2009),
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/2/w238.full.pdf+html.
48. Health Care Spending in the United States and Selected OECD Countries, KAISER
FAMILY
FOUNDATION
(Apr.
2011),
http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/
OECDO42111.cfm.
49. AJAY TANDON, ET AL., MEASURING OVERALL HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE FOR
191
COUNTRIES,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(2000), available
at www.who.int/
healthinfo/paper30.pdf (cluster on Evidence and Information for Policy/Global Programme
on Evidence for Health Policy).
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thirty-seventh,50 a showing that the New York Times referred to as
"dismal."s 1 More recently, the Commonwealth Fund compared the United
States with other advanced nations through surveys of patients and doctors
and analysis of other data. Its latest report, issued in May of 2007, "ranked
the United States last or next-to-last compared with five other developed
nations on the majority of performance measures, including quality of, and
access to, care. ,,52 In that same report, the Commonwealth Fund ranked the
United States first in providing the "right care" for a given condition as
defined by standard clinical guidelines. The United States scored highly for
preventive care services, such as pap smears and mammograms, as well as
blood tests and cholesterol checks. But the United States scored poorly "in
coordinating the care of chronically ill patients, in protecting the safety of
patients, and in meeting their needs and preferences." All of these poor
showings drove the overall quality rating down to last place for the country.
According to a New York Times article covering the Commonwealth
Fund report, "American doctors and hospitals kill patients through surgical
and medical mistakes more often than their counterparts in other
industrialized nations." 53 Estimates indicate that nearly 100,000 patients die
each year in the United States from preventable medical errors.5 At the
same time, patient safety measures have worsened by nearly one percent
each year for the past decade. 5
Health care associated infections
significantly drive up the cost of health care by nearly $28 to $33 billion per
56
year.
As state and federal governments, payers, and consumers recognize both
the enormity of quality concerns and financial pressures, and the connection
between the former and the latter, the public and private sectors have
responded in various ways in an attempt to reduce costs and improve
quality. The two programs analyzed in the next section, Medicare Hospital
Value Based Purchasing Program, and the Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement Initiative, each take varying approaches to accomplish the
same goals: reducing cost and improving quality.

50. Id.
51. Editorial, World's Best Medical Care? N. Y. TIEs, Aug. 12, 2007, at WK9,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/opinion/12sun1.html?pagewanted=all.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54.

K.T. KOHN, ET AL., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM, INST. OF

MEDICINE 26 (Nat'l Acad. Press, 1999).
55.

AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE

RESEARCH

AND

QUALITY,

NATIONAL HEALTHCARE

QUALITY REPORT, 2008 (2008) 14, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhqr08/nhqr08.pdf.
56. Id. at 7.
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III. PROGRAMS UNDER PPACAs1
A Medicare Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program
The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (hereinafter referred to as
the "Program") is a CMS initiative under PPACA that will reward acutecare hospitals with financial incentives for improvements in the quality of
care they provide to Medicare beneficiaries.58 The Program marks the first
time hospitals will be paid for inpatient acute care services directly based on
care quality, not only for the quantity of the services they provide, a stark
change from the fee-for-service reimbursement model that Medicare
currently utilizes. However, "it has sparked less discussion than has
another experiment to change Medicare's payment system through
accountable care organizations, where a select group of doctors and
hospitals get bonuses if they find ways to save money. 59 This is somewhat
surprising considering that the accountable care initiative will affect fewer
providers than will be impacted by the Program. 60
Under the final rule, Medicare will cut payments to the included
hospitals by 1 percent, setting that money aside for a "bonus pool." 61 In the
2013 Fiscal Year, the Program will distribute the funds in the bonus pool,
an estimated $850 million, to hospitals based on their overall performance
on a set of quality measures that have been linked to improved clinical
processes of care and patient satisfaction. 62 These incentive payments will
be taken from what Medicare otherwise would have spent for hospital stays,
and the size of the fund will gradually increase over time, resulting in a shift
from payments based on volume to payments based on performance. 63 The
bonus pool will increase to two percent of Medicare payments in October
2016.64 This bonus pool can result in significant additional reimbursement
for high performing hospitals.
Proponents of the Program believe that this change in the reimbursement
scheme will lead to improvement in care quality, while simultaneously
57. This Section will focus on the structure of the Program and the Initiative. The next
Section will delve into an analysis and criticism of both.
58. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3001(o)(2), 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
59. JORDAN RAU, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, MEDICARE ANNOUNCES RULES FOR QUALITY
BONUSES TO HOSPITALS,
(2011), available at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/
201 1/April/29/medicare-rules-for-hospital-quality.aspx?p=1.
60. Robert A. Berenson, Shared Savings Program for Accountable Care Organizations:
ABridge to Nowhere? AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE 721, 723-25 (2010).
61.

RAU, supra note 59.

62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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resulting in significant savings over time. According to CMS, the Program
measures will focus on how closely hospitals adhere to the best clinical
practices and how well hospitals improve their patients' care experiences. 65
When hospitals follow these effective best practices, CMS believe that
patients will receive higher quality care and see better outcomes. As a
result of patients healing without complication, this reimbursement model
can improve health and ultimately reduce health care costs. 66
The Program is anticipated to affect more than 3,000 acute care
hospitals, each having their payments adjusted beginning October 2012.6
However, there is also a lengthy list of hospitals that will be excluded from
these Medicare requirements, including: (1) Hospitals subject to a penalty
under the Hospital IQR program; 68 (2) Hospitals receiving immediate
jeopardy sanctions; (3) Hospitals with too few cases or measures; (4)
Critical access hospitals; 69 (5) Inpatient rehabilitation facilities; (6) Longterm care hospitals; (7) Children's hospitals; and (8) Specialty hospitals.70
As mentioned, reward payments will be linked for achievement or
improvement in quality of care and financial efficiency. Quality will be
judged based on measures set under the Program, with additional measures
being added each fiscal year. The scoring process utilizing these metrics
attempts to turn clinical and patient experiences into statistics that CMS in
turn can use to rank the performances of participating hospitals. CMS has
said the goals of the scoring method are to create a process that is
transparent, reflective of true differences in performance, eliminates
unintended consequences, considers improvement and achievement, and
uses the most currently available data.
B. Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative
Created under PPACA, the Bundled Payments for Care Initiative
(hereinafter referred to as the "Initiative") is a program aimed at physicians,
65.
66.

HEALTHCARE.Gov, supra note 5.
Id.

67.

Id.

68. Id. (Since 2004, CMS has collected quality and patient experience data from acute
care hospitals on a voluntary basis under the Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting Program
(IQR). The vast majority of hospitals now choose to participate in the IQR program in order
to be eligible for the full annual percentage increase in reimbursements each year, as a result
of legislation requiring Medicare to reduce the annual percentage increase for hospitals that
did not participate in the reporting program).
69. Id. (Although critical access hospitals are currently excluded from the Program,
CMS is required to conduct reports on critical access and smaller hospitals, implying there is
a high potential that these hospitals will be taken off the excluded list in the future).
70. 42 C.F.R. 412 (2011); 42 C.F.R. 480 (2011).
71.
HEALTHCARE.Gov, supra note 5.
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hospitals, and other health care providers to help improve care for patients
while they are in the hospital and after they are discharged. Under the
Initiative, payments will be aligned for services delivered across an entire
episode of care. This bundled payment method of reimbursement thus
differs from the current model, which provides payment for each service
separately. The Initiative, therefore, goes well beyond hospital diagnosisrelated groups (DRGs)72 by bundling hospital, physician, and other clinical
services into a single rate.
According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the
bundled payment method of reimbursement under the Initiative will give
health care providers new incentives to coordinate and improve the quality
of care, while saving money for Medicare.73 Department Secretary,
Kathleen Sebelius, says of the Initiative, "Patients don't get care from just
one person - it takes a team, and this initiative will help ensure the team is
working together. The Bundled Payments initiative will encourage doctors,
nurses and specialists to coordinate care. It is a key part of our efforts to
give patients better health, better care, and lower costs."74 HHS believes
that by bundling payment across providers for the multiple services
involved in one episode of care, health care providers will have a greater
incentive to coordinate care amongst each other, ensuring continuity of care
across settings and providers, thus resulting in better outcomes for
patients. In describing the Initiative, CMS noted that one Medicare heart
bypass surgery bundled payment demonstration saved $42.3 million
(roughly ten percent of expected costs) and saved patients $7.9 million in
copayments while improving care and lowering hospital mortality.76
This better coordinated care could theoretically reduce duplication of
services, preventable medical errors, and adverse outcomes for patients,
while simultaneously lowering costs due to providing more efficient care.
Former CMS administrator Donald Berwick, M.D., explains the impetus
behind moving away from a fee for service payment model and toward the

72. The prospective payment system is a per-case reimbursement mechanism under
which inpatient admission cases are divided into relatively homogeneous categories called
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). In this DRG prospective payment system, Medicare pays
hospitals a flat rate per case for inpatient hospital care so that efficient hospitals are rewarded
for their efficiency and inefficient hospitals have an incentive to become more efficient. This
is opposed to a fee for service (FFS) model, in which services are unbundled and paid for
separately.
73. News Release, HHS Press Office, Affordable Care Act Initiative to Lower Costs,
Help Doctors and Hospitals Coordinate Care, (Aug. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/201lpres/08/20110823a.html.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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fee-for-episode-of-care model:
From a patient perspective, bundled payments make sense. You
want your doctors to collaborate more closely with your physical
therapist, your pharmacist and your family caregivers. But that
sort of common sense practice is hard to achieve without a
payment system that supports coordination over fragmentation and
fosters the kinds of relationships we expect our health care
providers to have.
Under the Initiative, providers can apply to participate in one of four
models (discussed below), all of which group different services together for
bundled payments. Providers are defined broadly, and include physician's
groups, hospitals, physician-hospital organizations, nursing homes, and
others.78 To participate in the Initiative, physicians and hospitals design
their own models of bundled payment under the four general types of
payment models. Providers then submit bids to The Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Innovation. The bids must propose a target price for an
episode of care; participants would receive discounted payments under the
fee for service system, and at the end of the episode the total payments for
the care would be compared to the target price. Those involved in
providing the patient's care could share in any savings generated to
Medicare.
As mentioned, there are four available models for providers to design
their program. 9 The first three models involve retrospective payments. In
these models, CMS and providers set a target payment amount for a defined
episode of care.o Applicants would propose a target price, which would be
set by applying a reduction to total costs for a similar episode of care (to be
determined based on historical data). While participants in these models
would be paid under the traditional fee-for-service system, this payment
would be at a negotiated discount.8 2 At the conclusion of an episode, the
total payment amount would be compared with the target
price.83 Participants may share the profits resulting from this theoretically
more efficient care model. 84
Id.
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement, CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
INNOVATION (2012), http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-payments/index.html.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Bundled Payments for Care Improvement, CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
INNOVATION (2012), http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-payments/index.html.
77.
78.
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In Model 1, an episode of care would be defined as an inpatient stay in a
hospital.ss Medicare will provide the hospital a discounted payment based
on the rates established under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System
(IPPS). 86 Medicare will pay physicians independently for services rendered
under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. Hospitals and physicians will
then be allowed to share gains resulting from this improved coordination of
87
care.
In Model 2, the episode of care would include the inpatient stay and postacute care and would end, at the applicant's option, either a minimum of
thirty or ninety days after discharge.
In Model 3, an episode of care
would begin at the start of post-acute care with a participating Skilled
Nursing Facility (SNF), Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility (IRF), Long-Term
Care Hospital (LTCH) or Home Health Agency (HHA) within thirty days
of discharge from the inpatient stay and would end no sooner than thirty
days after the start of the episode. 89 In both Models 2 and 3, the bundle
would include services provided by physicians, post-acute provider care,
any related readmissions, and other Part B services proposed in the
definition of an episode definition (such as clinical laboratory services;
durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics and supplies (DMEPOS);
and Part B drugs). 90 The target price will be reduced from an amount based
on the applicant's typical fee for service payments for the episode of
care.91 Payments will be made at the usual fee for service rates, however,
after, the aggregate Medicare payment for the episode will be reconciled
against the target price.92 Any decrease in costs beyond the discount
reflected in the target price will be given to the participants to share among
the participating providers. 93
Finally, in Model 4, CMS would make a single, prospectively
determined bundled payment to the hospital that would encompass all
services furnished during the inpatient stay by the hospital, physicians and
other practitioners. Physicians and other practitioners would "submit "nopay" claims to Medicare and would be paid by the hospital out of the

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
90. Bundled Payments for Care Improvement, CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
INNOVATION (2012), http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-payments/index.html.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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bundled payment."94
While CMS has undertaken similar initiatives in the past, those projects
focused on inpatient services related to surgeries.9 5 The new Initiative is
much broader, as "it will encompass both in-hospital and post-discharge
care and can include chronic disease and other medical admissions, as well
as surgeries."9 6
IV. ANALYSIS
While the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program and the Initiative
represent a step in the right direction, there are quite a few problems with
the current structure of these programs. While it is clear that increasing
health care costs dictate that fundamental changes must be made to the
current health care reimbursement scheme, the Program and the Initiative
have weaknesses that must be addressed before they can accomplish their
goals. Although the weaknesses in both the Program and the Initiative are
quite problematic in their impact on the potential effectiveness of these new
reimbursement models, they could both represent a good starting point to
reduce costs and improve quality. For the Program and Initiative to make
any sort of meaningful impact, though, there will have to be significant
changes to the structure and scope of both. More importantly, there will
likely have to be fundamental changes to the federal government's
regulatory scheme for health care.
A Worsening Disparities for Vulnerable Populations
Studies, including one discussed below, have shown that rewarding
physicians for providing better care to patients could end up widening
medical disparities experienced by the most vulnerable populations: lower
income and minority groups. These studies demonstrate that under a
typical pay for performance reimbursement model, providers serving
vulnerable populations would likely receive lower payments than other
providers.97 This discrepancy is due in part to the gaps that already exist in
the quality of health care received by patients depending on their
demographics. The studies also suggest, however, that these pay for
94. Id.
95. James Arvantes, Bundled Payment Initiative May Provide Opportunities for Family
Medicine, AAFP NEWS Now (Aug. 31, 2011, 5:20 PM), http://www.aafp.org/online/en/
home/publications/news/news-now/practice-professionalissues/20110831bundledpayment.html.
96. Id.
97. Press Release, RAND CORPORATION, Performance-Based Payments for Primary
Care Providers May Worsen Disparities in Medical Care (May 4, 2010), available at
http://www.rand.org/news/press/2010/05/04.html.
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performance models "could divert resources away from medically needy
communities, further eroding the quality of medical care rather than driving
improved quality." 98
A study published in "Health Affairs suggests that if low-quality, highcost hospitals are financially penalized [through a system of performancebased payments], disparities in care are likely to worsen." 99
A
disproportionally higher number of elderly Black, Hispanic, and Medicaid
patients receive care in low-quality, high-cost hospitals in the South.100
"Given that low-quality hospitals often have lower margins than average,
the impact on them could be particularly striking," writes Ashish K. Jha,
MD, a professor of health policy at the Harvard School of Public Health.101
The authors of the study found that small public or for-profit institutions in
the South were considered the "worst" hospitals nationally because of both
low quality and high costs. 102 The "best" hospitals were more likely to be in
the Northeast, nonprofit, and have a cardiac intensive care unit.103 The best
hospitals1 0 also had a higher average proportion of Medicare patients and a
smaller proportion of elderly Hispanic patients. The worst hospitals had
twice as many elderly black patients as the best hospitals. "Elderly Hispanic
and Medicaid patients accounted for 4% and 23% of patients,

. .

. in the

worst hospitals, but only 1% and 150%at the best hospitals." 0 5
Overall, "patients cared for in the worst hospitals had a 12% to 19%
higher chance of dying in the hospital, and patients with an acute
myocardial infarction or pneumonia were 7% to 10% more likely to die
than those cared for in the best hospitals."1 06 The authors concluded:
"Our findings have important implications for Medicare's
forthcoming value-based purchasing program. The worst
institutions in particular will have to improve on both costs and
quality to avoid incurring financial penalties and exacerbating

98. Id.
99. Ashish K. Jha et al., Low-Quality, High-Cost Hospitals, Mainly in South, Care for
Sharply Higher Shares of Elderly Black, Hispanic, And Medicaid Patients, 30 HEALTH
AFFAIRS
1904
(Oct.
2011),
available
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/30/10/1904.full.html; see also Laura Newman, Disparities May Be Exacerbated by
Value-Based Purchasing, MEDSCAPE MEDICAL NEWs (2011), http://www.medscape.com/
viewarticle/751253?src=rss.
100. Jha, supra note 99.
101. Newman, supra note 99.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (clarifying that best was defined as having the lowest cost and highest quality).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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disparities in care. 107 As the United States embarks on efforts to
improve hospital care using value-based purchasing principles, we
will need to help hospitals improve quality and efficiency
simultaneously and to monitor the results of their efforts, so that
we do not inadvertently worsen disparities in care. "108
In the same study, researchers also found that average-sized physician
practices serving the highest proportion of vulnerable populations would
annually receive about $7,100 less than other practices under a pay for
performance program.1 09 That disparity has the potential to be even larger if
greater amounts of money are at stake. As it stands already, there are
relatively fewer health care providers located in communities with large
medically vulnerable populations.110 The authors of the study posit that "if
these providers receive lower reimbursements than other providers, new
resources may be diverted elsewhere, making it difficult to reverse existing
disparities.""' Blair Childs, an executive with Premier, an alliance of more
than 2,500 hospitals, said it best:
"The powerful thing about value-based purchasing is that it's
going to continually raise the bar. The bad thing is that if you start
behind and you're penalized financially and there are costs
associated with doing all the programs you need to do, you run the
risk of being in a death spiral.'
Taking this information into account, any pay for performance program
must be structured to account for the payment shortfalls that would
exacerbate these gaps. One approach could be to award grants to providers
caring for the vulnerable populations that would be negatively impacted by
these shortfalls. These grants, if targeted properly, could offset potential
financial and quality disparities. In addition, such grants could provide
another benefit by maintaining the financial incentive to improve the
quality of care for these populations. Physician Mark Friedberg, a
researcher who studies pay for performance programs says, "[w]e found
that practices that treat vulnerable populations have room for performance
improvement, so it's important to preserve the incentive to improve quality
of care while taking steps to prevent an increase in disparities."11

107.

Jha, supra note 99, at 1909.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1910.
RAND CORPORATION, supra note 97.

Id.
Id.
Rau, supra note 59.
RAND CORPORATION, supra note 97.
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B. Participation
One of the major weaknesses to both the Initiative and the Program is the
narrow scope with regard to which providers are included in these new
reimbursement model schemes. Perhaps the most noticeable gap in
participation would be how both the Program and the Initiative apply
exclusively to the Medicare program. While the Medicare program does
represent the largest expenditure by the federal government on health care,
and the largest payor of health care in the United States, there are still other
large payors in the health care system that are not being included under this
provision of PPACA. Medicaid, other federal and state government health
programs, employer-sponsored health plans, and private health plans are
being excluded from both the Program and the Initiative. While the hope
for proponents of both reimbursement models is that the success of these
programs will translate into providers and other payors choosing to utilize
value based purchasing and bundled payment models, there is no guarantee
that providers and payors will voluntarily choose to do so. Providers may
opt not to volunteer for either model with another payor as they likely
realize that the current fee-for-service payment model would provide them
with a higher reimbursement rate. Other payors may opt not to pursue these
reimbursement models due to the resources and capital involved in
completely overhauling how providers are reimbursed for their services.
Even then, to get to the point where other payors utilize these payment
models, there would have to be definitive proof that these programs work at
reducing cost like they promise.
Another problematic exclusion in the Initiative is the voluntary nature of
the program. The Bundled Payment Initiative is entirely voluntary for
providers. Those providers who determine that fee-for-service would yield
a higher reimbursement would likely not opt to switch to the bundled
payment model, where the benefits of any financial incentives could easily
be negated by taking a few extra patients under a fee-for-service payment
model. Thus, the Initiative may have limited impact on "bending the cost
curve" if it does not spread or providers choose to opt out. While the
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Model is mandatory for acute care
hospitals participating in Medicare,114 participation in Medicare itself is not
mandatory for all hospitals. (However, participation is mandatory for taxexempt hospitals.) Although Medicare has historically had significantly
higher participation rates than lower-reimbursed Medicaid, there has been
repeated discussion of significantly reducing Medicare reimbursement rates
for physicians. With these inevitable rate cuts, Medicare, like Medicaid,
114. This, of course, would not include those previously mentioned hospitals that have
been excluded from having to participate in the Program.
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will likely see a drop-off in physicians and non tax-exempt hospitals willing
to participate in the Medicare program.
C. Conflicting Aims of the Current Federal Regulatory Scheme
The Program and the Initiative suffer not only from weaknesses inherent
in their current structure, but also suffer as a result of the federal regulatory
scheme under which both projects must function. Fraud and abuse,
antitrust, and tax regulations make the successful implementation of the
Program and the Initiative quite difficult.1 s
An explanation of how far a law interferes with the Program and
Initiative goals is instructive. The Office of the Inspector General at the
Department of Health and Human Services (OIG) may impose civil
penalties and assessments on a provider or entity that engages in various
types of improper conduct with respect to federal health care programs.116
One provision of the Civil Monetary Penalty makes it illegal to provide
payments to induce reduction of limitation of services, known as the
"Gainsharing Provision." 1
If a hospital or a critical access hospital
knowingly makes a payment, directly or indirectly, to a physician as an
inducement to reduce or limit services provided with respect to
beneficiaries of a federal health program that are under the direct care of a
physician, the hospital will be in violation of the law. In addition, any
physician who accepts any such payment will also be in violation of the
law. Of course, encouraging physicians to focus on utilization and cost are
predicates to the Program and Initiative being successful.
Further, the Physician Self-Referral law, commonly referred to as the
Stark Law, prohibits physicians from referring Medicare and Medicaid
patients for the provision of certain designated health services to a provider
with which the physician (or an immediate family member) has a financial
relationship."' Providers may not bill the federal health care programs for
any service that has been provided in violation of the law.11 9 The Stark Law
was intended to prohibit physician ownership of certain ancillary services,
such as clinical laboratories, diagnostic imaging facilities, and so forth as a
response to numerous studies showing that such ancillary services were
subject to overutilization when the referring physician had a financial
interest.

115. For purposes of this paper, this discussion will mostly be limited to fraud and abuse
regulation concerns.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b) (2006).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b) (2006).
118. The Ethics in Patient Referral Act of 1989, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
119. Id.
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Unfortunately, the actual impact of the Stark Law has been not only to
limit physician ownership of ancillary services, but also to make difficult
certain beneficial relationships between physicians and hospitals. The
American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA) found that, even though the
Stark Law was intended to be directed at physicians, the impact of the Stark
Law falls primarily on hospitals and other institutional providers to which
physicians refer patients. 120 If a hospital accepts patient referrals in
violation of the Stark Law, it "could be required to return Medicare
reimbursement payments and to pay additional penalties under the False
Claims Act, even if the violations were unintentional and inadvertent." 12 1 A
violation that goes undetected for a significant period of time can lead to
substantial fines for the provider. 122
Furthermore, the Stark Law makes it difficult for providers to work
together to voluntarily develop or implement various arrangements
designed to improve health care quality and control costs, including
arrangements such as integrated delivery systems, pay for performance
arrangements, gainsharing arrangements, or bundled payments. According
to a practice update from the Akerman law firm, "The regulatory structure
of the Stark Law, if left unchanged, will be a direct impediment to two
principal objectives of the current health care reform initiative - improving
quality and managing costs." 123 Cooperative arrangements among various
providers could be the key to improving the quality of care provided and
reducing the cost of care provided to patients.1 24 The Stark Law assumes
that cooperative arrangements among providers may create incentives for
over-utilization of services.125 As such, the Stark Law must be altered as to
allow the type of cooperative arrangements among health care providers
that are necessary to both improve the health care quality and reduce health
care costs. 126
While Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) created under the Shared
Savings Program will receive fraud and abuse waivers that would insulate
the ACO and the providers from risks and liabilities under the Stark Law, 127
the anti-kickback statute, and the Gainsharing Prohibition under the Civil

120.

Marshall R. Burack, The Stark Law: Time for a Change?,
(Aug. 2009).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Marshall R. Burack, The Stark Law: Time for a Change?,
UPDATE (Aug. 2009).
127. 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2012).
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Monetary Penalty, 128 these waivers have not been extended to other
providers that are making changes to their health care delivery model in an
attempt to reduce cost and improve quality. 129 These waivers should apply
to providers participating in the Program and the Initiative. With the
Initiative being voluntary, the waivers may be the extra push that providers
need to opt into the program.
Furthermore, the Civil Monetary Penalty Law should be rewritten to
ensure that providers who are effectively and successfully participating in
an episodic payment or pay for performance reimbursement model will not
be penalized for participating in a program that reduces costs and improves
quality. The Stark Law also should be rewritten so that the scope of the
Stark Law will be limited, and compliance be made easier, by revising the
Stark Law to prohibit only certain specified relationships, such as physician
ownership of clinical laboratories, outpatient diagnostic imaging facilities,
and similar ancillary services which may be particularly subject to overutilization. The current version of the Stark Law, with its blanket
prohibition of referrals on almost all types of services, can unnecessarily
punish hospitals and discourage cooperative agreements among various
providers that may be critical to reducing costs and improving quality in
health care. The financial penalties under the Civil Monetary Penalty and
the Stark Law should not be trebled unless there has been shown to be
intentional violation or bad faith by the provider. These hefty fines
unnecessarily drive up costs.
Likewise, financial penalties beyond
restitution should not apply under Stark Law when the services provided
were medically necessary.
D. Self-Serving Behavior by Providers
One of the major problems with these programs is that they ignore the
human nature of providers.
Arguably, the Value-Based Purchasing
Program does a better job of acknowledging this problem by reducing
payments to those participants who do not meet predetermined quality and
cost benchmarks. Even then, the bonus pool is still only one percent of
total payments.130 While hospitals often run on razor thin profit margins,131
the time, effort and money required to meet or exceed all of these
benchmarks might wipe out any significant profit from pay for performance

128. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a(a)(5); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a(b); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a7b(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn.
129. 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2012).
130. RAu, supra note 59.
131. Maggie Fox, Update 1-US Hospital Profits Fall to Zero, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/03/02/hospitals-usa-idlNNO242705020090302.
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programs.
This problem is exacerbated by the voluntary nature of the Initiative.
While groups may receive extra payment if they provide care that is much
more efficient in the new model, there is no guarantee under the programs
that a participating provider would see significantly higher reimbursements
under either a bundled payment model or value based purchasing model. 132
As one physician said, regarding payment models that reward quality and
cost efficiency, "We should stop reimbursing so much for stuff we'd like to
discourage. To put it another way, I think if we stopped paying so much for
procedures, we would do less procedures. If I can see 20 patients a day, and
you offer to increase my pay 5% if I do an awesome job, I could work
harder, hire people, and try to make 5% more. Or, I could just see 21
patients a day. Guess which I'll do. And the latter will INCREASE
costs." 133
The lack of penalties will also become apparent when selectively
choosing patients becomes a concern. Critics worry that remodeling the
reimbursement scheme to financially reward cost efficiency could lead to
physicians and hospitals picking only the healthiest patients as sicker
patients tend to be more costly to treat. 134 A related practice, "dumping," is
when providers choose to end care for difficult, costly or otherwise
unwanted patients.135 The increased use of payment models that reward
outcomes and cost-efficiency, such as episodic payment and pay for
performance reimbursement models, raises concern that providers may
increase these cherry-picking and dumping behaviors and deny care to those
most in need, further driving health care costs upward. 136 A related concern
is that the widespread use of electronic medical records will make cherrypicking and dumping behaviors easier by providing physicians with easy to
use tools for data mining to determine which patients will be more
profitable. 137
Indeed, cherry-picking by some Medicare HMOs has been
documented. 13
Many Medicare HMOs are known to actively recruit
132. See generally the statutes and regulations associated with the Program and
Initiative.
133. Aaron Carroll, If Not Pay for Performance, Then What? THE INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/if-notpay-for-performance-then-what/.
134. Jim Bailey & Carson Strong, Cherry-Picking Patients Leaves Sour Taste,
AMERICAN
MEDICAL NEWs
(Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2011/04/18/prca0418.htm.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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clinical practices and patients in more affluent neighborhoods, offering
healthy seniors free meals and other inducements to switch from traditional
Medicare to their private HMO option.13 9 Unsurprisingly, few recruitment
events occur in low-income neighborhoods. 140
Another problem is that if Medicare sticks with the same quality metrics
for too long of a period of time and doesn't keep revisiting and revising
these standards, then the program risks encouraging an overly simplified
model of care. 14 Hospitals could become complacent and simply try to hit
the benchmarks on the small set of indicators that Medicare rewards,
without thinking about how to put in place the infrastructure to improve
quality of care across the board.142 In response, the federal government
plans to continually add other indicators over time, and it will rotate out
indicators when the great majority of hospitals have achieved a high level of
performance on them. 143 Still, Medicare must carefully monitor the effect
of the program to ensure that hospitals do not achieve a high level of
performance simply by diverting resources from other unrewarded, but
nonetheless important areas of care.
E. Rethinking How to Treat Costly Patients
Neither the pay for performance nor the episodic payment
reimbursement models take into account recent research on the
predictability of chronic illness. Physician Jeffery Brenner, brought to the
spotlight by Atul Gawande's New Yorker article, "The Hot Spotters,"
created a pilot model of health care in Camden, New Jersey that attempted
to improve quality while simultaneously reducing costs.144 His model was a
result of a fairly simple observation: that sick people with chronic (and
costly) diseases tended to be clustered in certain areas of the city.145
Surprisingly, the sickest parts of the city were not necessarily the poorest as
well. 146 Brenner, with hospital admission data, plotted the location of
patients with the highest health care costs.147 As suggested by Gawande's
139. Id.
140. Id. Later in this section, the paper will discuss how hospitals treating the most
vulnerable populations are at risk with the use of pay for performance and bundled payment
reimbursement models.
141. LUNA S. HINES, ET AL., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, AHRQ
PUBLICATION No. 08-0022, BECOMING A HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION: OPERATIONAL
ADVICE FOR HOSPITAL LEADERS 104 (2008).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Atul Gawnde, The Hotspotters, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 24, 2011, at 42.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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title, Brenner found "hot spots" of disease in unsafe nursing homes, or
housing projects with poor access to proper nutrition. 148 Brenner responded
to his discovery by providing special attention to these costly patients. 149
This special attention included more frequent medical visits, a "health
coach" of sorts to ensure these patients were taking their medication
regularly, and social workers to assistant with problems of insurance or
access to food.150 The results of the program on costs and health of the
patients involved
were astounding.
The thirty-six "super
utilizers .., averaged sixty-two hospital and E.R. visits per month before
joining the program and thirty-seven visits after-a forty-per-cent
reduction. Their hospital bills averaged $1.2 million per month before and
just over $500,000 dollars after-a fifty-six-per-cent reduction."1s1
Gawande holds that "the critical flaw in our health-care system that
people like . . . Brenner are finding is that it was never designed for the kind

of patients who incur the highest costs." 152 Oftentimes, the sickest, poorest,
and most costly patients in the United States are using the emergency room
as the "primary mechanism of service."153 Now, this is not to say that the
doctor's office and the hospital emergency room do not serve a necessary
role in health care delivery. According to Gawande, though, the problem
arises when the patients are those with complex problems, such as
"the forty-year-old with drug and alcohol addiction; the eightyfour-year-old with advanced Alzheimer's disease and a
pneumonia; the sixty-year-old with heart failure, obesity, gout, a
bad memory for his eleven medications, and half a dozen
specialists recommending different tests and procedures. It's like
arriving at a major construction project with nothing but a
screwdriver and a crane."154
This demonstration project brings to the forefront the question of
whether shifts in reimbursement schemes can actually impact the cost and
quality of care being delivered. In this situation, costs were considerably
reduced and patient health drastically improved, but not as a result of
changing how providers were reimbursed. Rather, it seems that a change in
how treatment was provided, which individuals are provided treatment, and
the holistic nature of the treatment is what made a difference. This raises the
148.
149.

Id.
Id.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Atul Gawnde, The Hotspotters, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 24, 2011, at 42-43.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id.
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question of whether the Program and the Initiative will make a meaningful
difference without shifting how we treat health problems. Of course, this
also raises the question of the role of prevention and amelioration of
behavior driven illness, such as obesity and diabetes. Solving these will
require significant resources.
F. Providing Care That Will be More Cost Effective
Both the Program and the Initiative plan to reduce costs by changing how
health care services are reimbursed, seemingly in hopes that in addition to
reducing payment, an indirect result will be that providers will alter their
behavior to reduce the use of unnecessarily expensive services as a personal
measure to increase their profits. However, both the Program and the
Initiative ignore the fact that providers are self-interested in providing
services that will yield them a profit. A prime example of how this selfinterest increases cost is the higher reimbursement rates for specialist
physicians as compared to primary care physicians.155 Often, specialist
physicians will provide services or procedures within the scope of practice
of a provider who could be reimbursed at a lower rate. 156
Both the Program and the Initiative can benefit from learning lessons
from reimbursement models that utilize the "gatekeeper" method of keeping
costs down, such as Health Maintenance Organizations. s5 With the
gatekeeper method, patients are prevented from seeing costlier specialists
until a primary care physician has vetted them to determine if they actually
do require the services of a specialist.s15 Not only do the Program and the
Initiative fail to discourage the use of expensive specialists, any other
project that only rethinks the reimbursement model would be working
within the confines of a healthcare system that does not encourage the
utilization of primary care as a cost-reduction method.
The Program and the Initiative do not attempt to modify the American
health care system to reduce the use of specialists. A major factor in
medical students choosing to pursue specialties, in addition to the prestige,
is the considerably higher pay associated with specialty areas of
medicine. 159 However, Medicare can, in fact, influence the number of
primary care physicians versus specialty physicians.
The Federal
155. See generally the CPT Code to compare reimbursement rate for primary care visits
versus procedures performed by specialists and surgeons.
156. Id.
157. See R.F. Caitlin, et al., Primary Care Gatekeepers in HMO, J. OF FAMILY
PRACTICE, 673, 673-78 (1983).

158.
159.

See 42 U.S.C. §300(e) (1996).

See MARK CRANE & LESLIE KANE, MA, MEDSCAPE PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION
REPORT 2011, http://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/compensation/201 1/.
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government, through the Medicare program, funds post-graduate Medical
training in the form of residencies. 1 60 As such, the Medicare program can
help increase the number of primary care physicians by reducing the
number of specialty residencies, thus increasing the number of primary care
specialties. Another way for Medicare to encourage cost-effective services
would be to lower reimbursement for specialty procedures. Lowering
surgical reimbursement in particular might be important, because surgery
tends to be costly and most prone to medical errors and adverse
outcomes.1 61
Even then, some studies have shown that merely increasing the number
of primary care physicians will likely not solve this problem. In a study
appearing in Health Affairs, RAND Corporation researchers concluded that
the best way to strengthen primary care in the United States would be to
reorient the focus of the health system rather than solely focusing on
training more primary care providers.1 62 There is an emerging consensus
that strengthening primary care will provide Americans with better health
care and help restrain the growth of health care spending,163 exactly what
the Program and the Initiative are aiming to accomplish.
RAND
researchers reviewed existing studies about primary care and its impact on
health care quality, outcomes and costs.1 64 "There is limited evidence that
simply increasing the number of primary care physicians in the nation will
improve health and slow the growth of health care costs unless we also
reorient the system to focus on primary care," said Dr. Eric Schneider, a
senior natural scientist at RAND and an author of the study.1 65 Important
steps that should be a part of any health system reorientation include
encouraging patients to use primary care providers as coordinators of their
health care, shifting investment from high-technology services to instead
support community-based primary care, and improving communication
between specialists and primary care providers.1 66
G. Experience in the United Kingdom
Finally, we can look at previous experience to learn much about the

160.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww (2012).

161.

See KOHN ET AL., supra note 54.

162. Mark W. Friedberg et al., Primary Care: A Critical Review of the Evidence on
Quality and Costs of Health Care, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRs 766 (2010), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/5/766.full.html.
163. Id.
164.

RAND CORPORATION, supra note 97.

165.
166.

Id.
Freidberg, supra note 162, at 770.
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utility of quality payment incentives.167 A similar program in the United
Kingdom a few years ago that utilized financial incentives to reduce costs
and improve quality proved not to be as successful as anticipated. 168
Granted, physicians in the United Kingdom who work for the National
Health Service (NHS) typically work on a salary basis,1 69 rather than a feefor-service basis; however, there are some applicable lessons for the United
States. Starting in 2004, NHS committed more than $3 billion toward a
program that would pay physicians bonuses of as much as twenty-five
percent of their total income.170 To qualify for this bonus, physicians had to
meet or exceed some or all of the 135 quality benchmarks that were predetermined by NHS.
Researchers at Harvard studied this UK program to see if they could
learn any lessons about the effectiveness of pay for performance on a
national scale. Rather than look at all 136 quality measures, the researchers
choose to focus on only a few pertaining to hypertension, one of the most
undertreated, expensive, and common diseases.172
The results were
disappointing, to say the least. After reviewing close to 500,000 primary
care patient records, researchers determined that the NHS' pay for
performance program had no effect on outcomes. 17 Patients were not any
healthier than they would have been if the financial incentive program
hadn't existed.174 Surprisingly, the physicians were not motivated (or
perhaps unable) to change their behavior with regard to costs and quality in
response to financial incentives.
Unfortunately, the study did not offer suggestions of how exactly
financial incentives could be used to positively alter physician behavior.
"Money by itself doesn't buy health," concluded Stephen Soumerai, co-

167. While there have been pay for performance success stories in health care, these
have been in the private sector and on a much smaller scale. As such, the successes and
lessons learned from those models cannot necessarily be applied to the Program and the
Initiative. See Gosden T. Forland, et al., Capitation, Salary, Fee-for-Service and Mixed
Systems of Payment: Effects on the Behaviour of Primary Care Physicians., COCHRANE
DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWs 3 (2006).

168. Kate Pickert, Money Isn't Everything, Even to Doctors, TIME, Jan. 26, 2011,
available at http://healthland.time.com/20 11/01/26/money-isnt-everything-even-to-doctors/.
169. Medical
Pay,
NHS
EMPLOYERS,
http://www.nhsemployers.org/
PAYANDCONTRACTS/MEDICALANDDENTALCONTRACTS/Pages/Medicalpay.aspx
(last visited Jan. 4, 2012).

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Pickert, supra note 168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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author of the study.176 "This is another example of policy makers embracing
a tool because they think it makes sense - not doing pilot testing and
spending billions of dollars." 1
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program and the Bundled
Payment Initiative are much-needed steps in a large-scale shift away from
the traditional, and flawed, fee for service reimbursement model, they will
likely not be the "magic pill" to cure what ails health care in the United
States. The Program and the Initiative reach too few providers, only reach
one payer, and have to work within the confines of a health care system and
federal regulatory scheme that work against both programs' ability to reach
their full potential in meeting the grand expectations that have been placed
on them. The Program and the Initiative are somewhat effective in that they
are bringing to the forefront the notion that fundamental changes must be
made to how providers are reimbursed for their services if escalating health
care costs are to be stopped. This is certainly a key piece of the puzzle.
By giving the Program and the Initiative the best chance possible at
meeting their goals of reducing cost and improving quality, valuable lessons
can be learned and then applied to other key players and aspects in the
health care world. For example, the clinical integration necessary to
effectively participate in the Initiative could easily spread to other providers
and payers if the Initiative is able to demonstrate that this integration can
drastically reduce costs for both providers and payers, and improve the
patient experience. The cost consciousness required for both the Program
and the Initiative could fundamentally alter how payers and providers think
about health care delivery, and, in particular, encourage the shifting the
delivery of some care to "lower rung" providers, such as physician
assistants or nurse practitioners, as a method of cost reduction.
The weaknesses inherent in the current structure of both the Program and
the Initiative lessen the likelihood that either Medicare response will lead to
the dramatic changes in cost and quality that their creators so desire. While
the Program and the Initiative should not be scrapped (their usefulness in
being the first large scale shift away from the costly and ineffective fee for
service model should not be underestimated), without correcting these
glaring weaknesses, the Program and Initiative will fail. Worse yet, if the
Program and Initiative fail, other payers and providers will likely be
discouraged from proceeding with their own major shifts in how health care
is financed and delivered in this country.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
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